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PARTNERS IN INTERMODALISM
Good Afternoon. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to speak
to you today. I must say that it was mighty generous of Cal Grayson to
invite a resident from Big Orange Country to the home of the Big Blue.
The trip up here normally isn't so pleasant for us Tennesseans. I guess
since it is not basketball season yet, though, I can go back with my
dignity intact. Seriously, though, it is always a pleasure to be here.
When Mr. Grayson called and asked me to address this session, I
asked him what the themes were. He responded that the overall conference theme was Transportation Partners for Quality and that this
session specifically focused on intermodalism. Now, I have been in
academia for four years, but before that I spent seven years in logistics
management, and the terms quality, partnership, and intermodal were
mutually exclusive terms. The transportation world is indeed changing,
and now you can't do business without considering each of these elements.
Let me begin with the following definitions:

-Multimodalism is the process of considering all modes of

transportation.

-Intermodalism is the process oflooking at linkages, interactions,
and movements between transportation modes.
In this country, we have long taken a multimodal approach in both
the public and private sectors, although our consideration leans rather
more heavily towards some modes than others. Private sector consider88

ation ofintermod alism is nothing really new. Intermodal transportat ion
has been practiced in various forms for many years. It is the public
sector promotion ofintermod alism that is really coming on strong.
The passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportat ion Efficiency Act
(!STEA) in 1991 did more than anything else in recent years to raise
intermodali sm in the consciousness of the public sector transportati on
community. The stated goal of ISTEA is to:
"...develop a National lntermodal Transportat ion System that is
economically efficient, environmen tally sound, provides the foundation
for the nation to compete in the global economy and will move people and
goods in an energy-efficient manner ..."
The Act makes the improveme nt of intermodal connections a major
federal aim. It created an Office of Intermodali sm in the U.S. Department of Transportat ion, and it outlined, among other things, the requirement for state governmen ts to develop intermodal managemen t systems.
There are real opportuniti es for the public sector to coordinate the
interests of public/priva te interests, resolve land use and zoning issues,
and to assess the economic, environmen tal, and traffic impacts of
intermodalism.
lntermodal ism has many possible implementa tions for freight,
including rail-highwa y, rail-barge, rail-ocean vessel, truck-barge , truckocean vessel, and truck-air. (Passenger intermodali sm has exciting
possibilities in the air-high speed rail area, and is no less important in
!STEA, but I will confine my remarks to freight transportati on.) The
current emphasis in intermodali sm focuses on combinations of the rail,
highway, and ocean vessel modes.
lntermodal transportat ion is, almost by definition, a partnership . In
the United States, unlike other countries (such as Canada), transportation companies have a limited degree of horizontal integration. Therefore, intermodal movements traditionally involve two or more transportation providers. In rail-highwa y moves, for example, an intermodal
move might involve a third party marketer, a drayage company for
pickup and delivery, and one or more railroads for the line haul. These
firms should all be partners, since they are working towards the common
goal of selling and providing a service. Unfortunate ly, traditional intermodal partnership s often demonstrate d little marital bliss.
In today's commercial environmen t, where quality is becoming a
watchword, partnership is being taken considerably further than the
above example indicates. To compete globally, U.S. firms must provide a
quality product at a competitive cost. To accomplish this, manufactur ers
are tightly integrating transportati on providers into their production
processes. The service providers are becoming true partners in the
production and distribution of the end product. At the same time, and
perhaps because of this, the intermodal players are seeking to forge true
partnership s which exploit the strengths of each firm. There are now, as
a result of ISTEA, opportunitie s for the public sector to help forge and to
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participate in these partnerships. I plan, during my talk, to explore each
of these trends in more detail. First, however, I'd like to give some
background on the intermodal environment and illustrate how we have
arrived at the current status.
Rail-highway and rail-vessel intermodal services have been around
for many years. The railroads have hauled highway trucks since at least
the 1920s, although trailer-on-flat-car (TOFC) service volume was first
widely offered during the 1950s and 1960s. Similarly, railroad containeron-flat-car (COFC) dates from early in the century. Unlike TOFC, COFC
volumes remained relatively small in the U.S. until the 1970s. The direct
transfer of commodities in bulk between rail cars and ocean vessels has
been conducted since the early years of rail transportation.
Railroad TOFC service was developed in an attempt to reverse the
loss of high value freight to motor carriers. The railroads offered 14
different "plans" for traditional TOFC service. These generally varied in
the details of which party provided the highway equipment and performed pick-up and delivery functions. During the boom years ofTOFC
growth, the railroads constructed hundreds of terminals nationwide to
handle the loading and unloading of trailers from rail cars. These were
often small facilities without much mechanized equipment, relatively
poor access to the highway system, and little area for equipment storage.
As such, they were relatively inefficient and costly to operate.
A key element of TOFC marketing was the cost differential between
it and motor carrier truckload service. The railroads sought to recapture
their market share by undercutting motor carrier pricing. The construction of the Interstate Highway System provided the trucking industry
with the opportunity to greatly improve service levels. At the same time,
the rail physical plant was deteriorating as the railroads faced extreme
financial pressures. Motor carrier management frankly outperformed
rail management by identifying opportunities, solving service problems,
maintaining high customer service standards, and marketing their
product. Increasingly, shippers equated motor carrier service with
premium transportation and willingly paid the higher rates.
The broker was an integral element of traditional intermodal transportation. Brokers operated off the margin obtained by consolidating
shipments to TOFC level, building sufficient volume to get more favorable rates, or by providing value added services such as drayage. In
effect, brokers served as a TOFC marketing arm for the railroad. Seldom, if ever, did brokers provide or own any of the equipment involved
in intermodal operations. When performed by reputable firms, brokering
performed a valuable function and helped to build volume. Unfortunately, brokers were sometimes dishonest, financially unstable, incompetent, or otherwise unable to perform. The few bad actors tainted the
waters for many shippers who would have otherwise used TOFC.
Railroad operations involving TOFC often left much to be desired.
Railroads frequently attempted to operate TOFC equipment in regular
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"loose car" train service. This resulted in unacceptable loss and damage
as cars were switched in yards and greatly enhanced transit times over
truck competition. To use TOFC service, shippers were required to use
special trailers (always in short supply) and to block and brace cargo to
withstand the rigors of rail handling. The railroads could never seem to
find your load in their system when you called for a trace. As a shipper,
you had to deal with the broker and his bill and the railroad and its bill.
It was always hard to figure out how much the shipment cost. Shippers
faced a real battle in trying to file and collect claims for their frequently
damaged or lost shipments. It is little wonder that motor carrier sales
forces had it so easy.
The railroad TOFC plans attracted rather low valued commodities
which were not time sensitive. The railroad industry seemed unable to
recognize that service had value. By the early 1980s, rail intermodal
profits were widely considered to be marginal at best, and the railroads
continued to lose market share in many intermodal corridors. There
were some intermodal success stories. United Parcel Service (UPS) made
extensive use of intermodal to handle its small parcel service. UPS was
successful in this because it tendered large volumes, sufficient in many
cases for dedicated trains and certainly large enough in any case to gain
leverage with rail management. A few major railroads, such as Conrail
and Santa Fe, counted on intermodal for such a large revenue share that
they actively solicited the business and sought to provide and sell service. This worked well as long as the entire movement was internal to
their systems, but once a shipment was interlined to another rail carrier,
they had no control over the service levels.
Obviously, from this synopsis, you might gather that there were a
number of players-railroads, brokers, shippers, drayage firms, etc.--with
vested interests in intermodal transportation. Yet, each seemed to
function according to its own self-interest, and there was little true
partnership. What happened to change this?
In 1980, Congress passed the Staggers Rail Act, which greatly
deregulated the rail industry. Staggers gave the railroads more freedom
in pricing and the ability to offer contract rates. The Motor Carrier Act of
1980 relaxed entry requirements for the trucking industry. The Interstate Commerce Commission followed with a series of rulings largely
deregulating TOFC rates.
These rulings had a dramatic effect on the ailroads and motor
carriers. U oder the freedoms accorded by Staggers, the U.S. railroad
industry had record revenues during the 1980s. The carriers used these
revenues to implement extensive capital improvement programs to
upgrade and rehabilitate their physical plant and equipment. At the
same time, they downsized by eliminating excess plant and slimming
their labor force. The railroads succeeded, through negotiation, in
reducing labor requirements and in effectively cutting costs. By the mid1980s, many analysts felt that the U.S. rail system was at an all time
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peak condition. Even so, rail market share continued to decline, although
absolute tonnage levels reached record levels.
For the motor carriers, on the other hand, deregulation offered
mixed blessings. The relaxing of restrictions on market entry and pricing
fostered fierce competition. Many old line trucking companies disappeared from the scene. A general decline in highway conditions along
with increased congestion whittled away at motor carrier service levels.
A national driver shortage raised the price of labor, and fuel prices rose
throughout the decade. The carriers were able to use increases in productivity gained from increased vehicle sizes to partially offset cost
increases.
Without a doubt, cost pressures contributed to a first wave of intermodal volume increases in the 1980s. Economic slumps in the early
1980s made shippers more cost conscious. In response, traffic was
diverted to the lower cost intermodal alternative. With the increased
ability of the railroads to provide service, some traffic remained in
intermodal service. Fuel price increases also increased the cost advantage ofintermodal. Fuel represents 8-10 percent of operating costs for
rail intermodal verses 15-20 percent for motor carriers. Increased fuel
costs therefore tend to shift traffic to intermodal service.
The first new wave of intermodal partnerships was initiated by the
steamship lines. Faced with a tidal wave of inbound import traffic as a
result of the U.S. trade deficit, these lines looked toward rail intermodal
to move containers from their vessels to market areas deep within U.S.
borders. Vessel lines used COFC to landbridge container traffic from port
to port across the continent. This traffic had a domestic leg, however,
and furthermore, the containers had to be returned to the port for return
to the overseas point of origin for reloading.
To handle their traffic at competitive costs, the vessel lines adapted
the double stack platform, an innovation introduced by the Southern
Pacific Railroad. Double stacking containers significantly increased
COFC productivity, offering as much as a 40 percent cost advantage over
single stack operations. This was important, since the long inland hauls
placed the vessel lines at a cost disadvantage.
The steamship lines looked at their empty container backhaul and
decided to solicit domestic freight to cover their costs. To their surprise,
the domestic freight volumes soon became extremely lucrative. The
railroad company operated the trains, while.the vessel operators marketed the service and provided all support services to the customer
(billing, tracing, etc.). Despite concerns that double stack services competed with their traditional TOFC business and that they were being
pressured to accept unreasonably low rates, the railroads found the
traffic volumes offered by the vessel lines too attractive to resist.
By the late 1980s, vessel lines had entered into numerous partnerships with railroads to provide double-stack services. Companies such as
American President Lines, Mitsui OSK, NYK Lines, and SeaLand were
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operating double-stack services in conjunction with various railroads.
These were true partnerships.
The case of American President Companies (APC) is illustrative.
APC entered the double-stack market to assist its vessel line (APL)
which served Pacific Coast ports. APC planned to use rail to reach inland
markets, many of which could be more cheaply reached by an all water
move. The company decided to use dedicated rail service to provide a
premium service for which shippers would pay higher rates. It developed
close working relationships with selected rail carriers to ensure that
strict performance standards were met. APC purchased several intermodal brokers to solicit backhaul freight.
APC's partnership with the railroads focused on a joint approach to
shipper problems. APC personnel were assigned in a liaison role to the
railroad terminals. Dedicated staff at headquarters coordinated line-haul
activities with railroad management. APC managed all terminal operations; the railroad simply operated the container trains. APC provided
railroads financial assistance for clearance improvement projects necessary to handle the double-stack equipment. The Union Pacific Railroad
proposed to drop all conventional TOFC service in favor of APC managed
COFC service.
A second interrnodal partnership relationship has sprung up between
major Interrnodal Marketing Companies (IMC), the vogue term for
brokers, and the railroads. The major railroads have long been concerned
by the problems associated with poor IMC performance, yet have depended upon the ability of these companies to generate intermodal
business. This need has become more acute as railroads have downsized
and centralized their own sales and marketing departments. The railroads have therefore tended recently to seek relationships with a selected number of reputable IMCs. In return, the IMCs have become more
insistent upon quality performance from the railroads upon which to
base their marketing efforts.
The third interrnodal provider relationship, and perhaps the one
which offers the greatest possibility for realizing the ultimate potential
for intermodal freight, is that between motor carriers and railroads.
Such is the potential of these relationships that the 1990s has been
termed the decade of intermodalism. These partnerships should take
advantage of the strengths of each participant:
-Low cost, high productivity long haul capability of the railroad
-Local pick-up/delivery capability of the motor carrier
-Marketing and customer service expertise of the motor carrier
It is refreshing that motor carriers and railroads, long bitter rivals,
should be cooperating rationally in the 1990s. From the standpoints of
both modes, there are strong economic reasons why these partnerships
are sensible .
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At first glance, railroad intermo dal growth has been impress ive in
terms of volume. Consid er that 1992 lifts exceeded 6.7 million, a better
than 100 percent increas e over 1980 volumes, and a 7.4 percent over
1991 levels. Almost 50 percent of these lifts were double-stacked. Yet,
intermo dal capture s only 3-4 percent of total intercit y freight movements. In terms of the trucklo ad market (500+ miles), intermo dal does
somew hat better, with an estimat ed 15 percent share. The railroad s have
had difficulty in overcoming on their own the image of intermo dal traffic
as a low cost, low quality alterna tive to motor carrier service. This has
left them with the low rated moves and slim margin s on intermo dal
busines s. Equipm ent has been another barrier to railroad intermo dal
growth . The railroad s have difficulty in achievi ng satisfac tory utilization
statistic s for their own trailers used in TOFC service. The rapid growth
of trailer sizes has rendere d much railroad intermo dal equipm ent prematurely obsolete, further contrib uting to intermo dal financi al woes. With
intermo dal loads contrib uting $6 billion+ in annual revenue s and 20
percent of the total rail carloadings, the industr y must find a more
effective way to handle the busines s.
Truckin g companies, on the other hand, achieve relative ly high fleet
utilizat ion, manage rapid fleet turnove r to keep pace with technology,
and market quality service. Yet motor carrier financi al perform ance has
been margin al for the past few years. Motor carrier bankru ptcies hit
record levels in 1990 and 1991. Profit margin s have been razor thin,
averagi ng about 1.6 percent during the period 1987-1991. 1991 revenues
average d $1.84/mile, down $0.05/mile from 1990. Driver shortag es have
been a severe problem in the industr y, and increas ed highwa y congestion, especially in urban areas, have impacte d service standar ds.
These relative pressur es have no doubt influen ced the creatio n of
rail-mo tor carrier partner ships. While by no means common yet, these
partner ships have received a great deal of attentio n because they involve
major players in both industr ies.
The oldest and best known rail-mo tor carrier intermo dal partner ship
is the Quantu m service establis hed by J.B. Hunt and various railroad s.
J.B. Hunt, a large trucklo ad carrier, has prosper ed since deregul ation
through a combin ation of aggressive market ing and premiu m service. In
the Quantu m operati on, Hunt sought to develop partner ships with rail
carriers to attract new trucklo ad busines s and move it intermo dally.
Quantu m was to be market ed as a seamles s premiu m service. Hunt
would perform the sales, pick up and delivery, and billing operatio ns,
with the rail partner providi ng the line haul. There was no third party or
IMC involvement.
Hunt's decision to establis h Quantu m was driven by the realizat ion
that motor carrier operatio ns were no longer cost competitive with rail
intermo dal in long-ha ul corridors. The service started in 1990 with a
midwes t-Califo rnia lane using the Santa Fe Railway. Quantu m provided
dedi_c ated trailers for this service. Third-m orning delivery time was a key
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selling point. Since 1991, Hunt has expanded Quantum using five
additional railroads CUP, BN, CR, SP, and CN) to serve all regions of the
country except the southeast. There are rumors that Hunt is seeking a
partner with which to enter this territory. The most recent partnership
with Canadian National Railway allows Hunt access to the Canadian
market.
Has Quantum been successful? Industry sources indicate that the
original midwest-California lane handled over 100,000 units in 1992.
Further, the expansion seems to be an indication of financial viability.
Quantum seems to have taught Hunt one interesting lesson. The company recently announced plans to replace its trailer fleet (17,000 units)
with 24,000 intermodal containers and chassis. This decision was undoubtedly fostered by the potential economies offered by double stacking.
In addition, Hunt developed a container family with the full 110" clearance offered by conventional trailers, thus eliminating one shipper
complaint about container equipment. Hunt reportedly has no plans to
purchase further conventional trailers.
Con-Way Intermodal (CWI) is a unit of Consolidated Freightways
Corp., holding company for a major motor carrier. In 1991, CWI
launched its Con-Quest premium intermodal service, again in conjunction with major railroads. Con-Quest is in an expansiqn phase, with the
recent announcement of service to Memphis, Charlotte, and Columbus,
Ohio, markets. CWI also is investing $4.9 million in chassis and containers.
Schneider National is a third major player in the motor carrier
industry that is entering the intermodal market. Schneider· started
midwest-west lanes in 1991 using the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific
railroads. The company is working with rail carriers to develop a larger
network.
Thus far, I have talked about partnerships between transportation
providers. There is another type of partnership which is equally important--the partnership between transportation users and providers. The
emphasis on quality which is sweeping American industry is to a large
degree responsible for these partnerships.
During the 1980s, American business, under pressure from global
competitors, rediscovered quality management philosophies. The lessons
of Dr. Edward Deming had been a great influence on Japanese industry,
helping it to achieve a worldwide reputation for superior quality. As
American industry embraced quality management, the relationships
between transportation companies and users began to change.
Dr. Deming outlined 14 management steps as being essential to
quality. The following points directly influenced carrier-user partnerships:

d
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1. End the practic e of award ing busine ss based upon the price tag.
rm
Move toward s a single suppli er for any one item. Base this long-te
relatio nship on loyalty and trust. (10)
2. Improv e consta ntly and forever the system of produc tion and
service. (11)
3. Create consta ncy of purpos e toward improv ement of produc t and
e jobs.
service to become competitive and to stay in busine ss and to provid
(14)

A recent survey of top U.S. compa nies reveal ed that 70 percen t had
ed
intern al quality progra ms. Thirty percen t of the compa nies requir
same
this
In
transp ortatio n provid ers to have a quality progra m, also.
for
survey , these compa nies award ed motor carrier s a 74-per cent score
quality verses a 36-per cent score for railroa ds.
Indust ry empha sis on quality has had a numbe r of impac ts on
transp ortatio n. A Univer sity of Tenne ssee survey of the top 100 U.S.
the
corpor ations reveal ed that compa nies are overwh elming ly reduci ng
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ss.
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numbe r of transp ortatio n compa
n
are taking a serious look at the service offered by compa nies in additio
a
take
and
ers
custom
their
study
must
to price. Successful provid ers
enproact ive role in developing and mainta ining service standa rds to
s
carrier
ng
bringi
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ers
custom
,
return
In
ss.
hance the custom er busine
on
into their planni ng process and allowing them to work hand-i n-hand
long-ra nge distrib ution planni ng projects.
How does this affect interm odal providers? It is obvious that interto low
modal needs to achieve a reputa tion for quality service in additio n
.
flexible
and
cost. lnterm odal service must be easy to use, reliabl e,
ss
lnterm odal compa nies must unders tand how their custom ers do busine
the
Given
ss.
and make their services an integra l part of the busine
the
potent ial busine ss volume for interm odalism ($30-40 billion/year),
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reward s for doing so are significant. As J.B. Hunt
and
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the
Interm odal Expo, "The guy who does it best, with
."
the lowest cost to the shipper will be the winner
The automobile indust ry is perhap s the best examp le of a shippe r/
acinterm odal provid er partne rship. The major U.S. automo bile manuf
"just-in
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techniq
quality
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turers have been quick to embrac
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time." Of course, the Japane
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rate,
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new
their
long traditi on of quality to
automo bile indust ry has been ready interm odal custom ers. The Triple
rn
Crown Roadr ailer and contai ner service started by Norfolk Southe
which
,
Crown
Triple
ss.
busine
parts
auto
of
handle s a sizable volume
is
works closely with the manuf acture rs, is a premiu m service which
with
ously
utonom
semi-a
e
operat
to
d
allowe
but
owned by a railroa d,
motor carrier oriente d manag ement. Automotive parts busine ss reportedly is a key compo nent of the double-stack and premiu m TOFC offered
by the compa nies alread y discus sed herein . There are numer ous reports
in the trade press of the develo pment of joint facilities at custom er
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locations, dedicated service lanes, and dedicated equipment to support
partnerships between these intermodal users and providers.
The final aspect of intermodal partnerships I would like to address
involves partnerships between the public and private sectors. We in the
public sector have a vested interest from a policy standpoint in promoting intermodal transportation.
-In many cases, intermodal transportation is the most rational and
economic means of handling freight. It makes the best use of existing
transportation infrastructure.
· -Intermodalism helps to keep American industry competitive.
-Intermodalism has positive environmental and safety impacts (10
percent of the hydrocarbons and 33 percent of the NOx and COx of truck
alone).
-Intermodalism reduces the strain on congested highways and
alleviates the need to build new facilities.
The public sector/private sector partnership should, therefore,
promote intermodal transportation. Public sector contributions to the
partnership are as follows:
-Resolving land use and zoning issues
-Coordination of various public/private interests
-Assessing traffic, environmental, and economic impacts
-Promotion
-Financial assistance
-Infrastructure ownership and management
Provision of intermodal terminal facilities has been a very visible
part of the public/private intermodal partnership. Many port facilities
are owned by government bodies. Port managers are actively enhancing
intermodal connections so that their facilities can accommodate doublestack service. Often this support extends beyond the port property. The
Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, for example, are negotiating with
the Southern Pacific Railroad to purchase an existing 20-mile-long
railroad right-of-way for $275 million. They would construct a new joint
access rail line and a dedicated truck road on this right-of-way to serve
container port facilities. The Port of San Francisco agreed to pay for $11
million in tunnel clearance improvements on a Southern Pacific rail line
serving its port area. This would allow double stack access to the port.
Massachusetts authorities plan to fund an extensive railroad clearance
improvement program to allow double-stack access to Boston terminals.
Virginia has constructed an inland container facility near Port Royal.
Trucks would deliver containers here for forwarding via rail service to
the Norfolk container port.
It is interesting to me that most of these partnerships involve government at a local level teaming with a carrier or company. The project
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titypically has an economic impac t on the local area--keep a port compe
l
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true
contex t of a domestically oriente d interm odal service will the
potent ial of interm odalism be realized. Perhap s ISTEA will shape thinking in this regard .
I've tried to give some overall perspective to intenn odal transp ortaying
tion as I see it. I hope that my talk has been of some help in identif
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key issues and opport unities in intenn odal partne
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